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RFID are small wireless devices which can be used 
for identification of objects and humans as well. Their 
acceptance has grown in past years and is expected to 
grow further. Due to reduction in cost of production 
RFID devices are being deployed in large numbers in 
supply chains (by Wal-Mart, etc.) In this paper we 
provide a comprehensive survey of various RFID 
authentication protocols proposed in the literature and 
classify them in different categories. We then study 
RFID authentication protocols having minimalist 




RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) is a 
technology used for the identification of objects. RFID 
has gained popularity in past few years. RFID 
technology started to replace the more tradition system 
of barcodes mainly due to the efforts of Wal-Mart, 
Procter and Gamble, etc. 
A RFID system is basically composed of a RFID 
Transponder (tag) and a RFID Interrogator (Reader). 
The RFID tag is microchip connected to an antenna. 
This tag can be attached to an object, which needs to 
be uniquely identified, e.g. it can be used in a 
storehouse to track the entry and exit of goods. This tag 
contains information similar to the barcode, which 
stores the unique properties of the object to which it is 
attached. A RFID reader can access this information. 
The RFID reader communicates with the RFID tag 
using radio waves. The main advantage of RFID tags 
over barcode system is: 
1. RFID system uniquely identifies the object “e.g. 
114119201 is a bottle of jam of X company.” 
2. RFIDs do not require line of sight. The objects 
(tags) should be in a range much larger than 
barcodes would allow, and there is no need to 




Figure 1:RFID Architecture [8] 
 
RFID tags can be a passive tag which does not have 
any power source; they derive their power from the 
radio frequency generated by the reader. Tags that 
derive their own power are semi-passive tags in which 
batteries supply power when tags are interrogated by a 
reader and passive tags whose batteries provide power 
for transmission. 
Within the RFID technology there are several 
security issues, which need to be tackled in order to 
make this technology more robust and reliable. The 
key security properties like confidentiality1, integrity2, 
availability, authentication and anonymity3 need far 
more attention.  
These security issues can be explained by the 
following scenario. Let us consider a storehouse, a 
malicious reader can eavesdrop the communication 
between tag and reader, thus confidentiality and 
anonymity is lost. A malicious reader can tamper the 
data stored in the tag, thereby compromising the data 
                                                        
1 confidentiality in communication between the tag and 
the reader. 
2 reliability of the information on the RFID tag. 
3 Anonymity to undesired and anonymous scanning of 
items or people. 
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integrity. In some cases a message jamming attack or a 
Denial of Service attack can hamper the 
communication between a reader and a tag which can 
bring system to a halt by which current status at the 
storehouse cannot be made available at a moment. A 
malicious authentication can make a fake tag to 
impersonate the real one which can result in serious 
security issues. 
In this paper we heavily focus on authentication 
issues and will provide a generic classification of 
various authentication protocols.. Authentication 
basically provides a certain level of trust amongst the 
reader and the tag such that the identity of the tag is 
verified and vice versa. 
 Each year quite a large number of RFID 
authentication protocols are published in scientific 
literature [2]. Some of these protocols are well-suited 
for only one particular solution, others are found to be 
fallacious and later corrected; and finally some 
proposals are trivial and are subsequently discarded. 
This induces us to give a proper classification of all the 
RFID authentication protocols. But attributes of a 
protocol such as its structure, or some complex 
cryptographic function may make classification 
difficult. Conceptually speaking classification means 
distinguishing on the basis of general prototypes which 
can cover various fundamental protocols. The author’s 
in [1] stated that classification of authentication 
protocols is based on three points 
1. Underlying algorithm used in the protocols. 
2. Procedure of message exchange. 
3. Secure combination of above two. 
The concentration on message exchange has helped 
in abstracting away from cryptographic mechanism. 
There are few definitions which must be deduced from 
[1], these are discussed in detail in section 2 under 
preliminary concepts.  
In section 3 we will explain the basic process of 
classification and the prominent prototypes of 
protocols. In section 4 we will discuss recent 
authentication protocols on RFID and analyze various 
security & privacy protection and integrity related 
issues. In the end we will conclude the paper in section 
5.  
 
2. Preliminary Concepts 
 
Definition 1.Forced Challenge (F): If the fresh data is 
a random nonce generated by the verifier and then 
delivered as a plaintext or a ciphertext to the prover, 
then we say that the protocol uses a forced challenge to 
authenticate the prover. 
Self Challenge(S): If the fresh data is generated by the 
prover himself the protocol is said to use self 
challenge. 
No Challenge (Ø): When there is no challenge value 
exchanged in the protocol, we say that the protocol has 
no challenge. 
 
Definition 2. Origin Authentication (OA): If a protocol 
contains a message which is generated by application 
of private key on cryptographic particles. i.e. the 
message is of the form APriKey{•} then we say the 
protocol provides origin authentication of the entity. 
 
Destination Authentication (DA): If a protocol contains 
a message which is generated by application of public 
key on cryptographic particles. i.e. the message is of  
the form APubKey{•} then it provides destination 
authentication of the entity A. 
 
Implicit Authentication (IA): If a protocol contains no 
message of the form APriKey{•} or APubKey{•}, but 
still requires entity A to compute a value of the form 
APriKey{ •}, then we say that the protocol provides 
implicit authentication of A. 
 
3. Protocol Classification 
 
As discussed earlier as well as in [1], classification 
of authentication protocols implies distinguishing them 
on the basis of fundamental prototypes. However, the 
inclusion of extraneous information may make 
classification difficult. Therefore, the basic 
requirement is to identify the essential elements in the 
authentication protocols and the way they are 
combined and used. The authors have recognized the 
basic elements as the type of authentication and the 
types of challenge values. So the basic steps of 
classification are: 
Step 1: Identify the type of authentication used in a 
given protocol. Is it Implicit Authentication (IA), 
Origin Authentication (OA) or Destination 
Authentication (DA)? 
Step 2: Identify the type of challenge values used 
between two identities (i.e. sender and receiver) in a 
given protocol. is it forced challenge (F), self challenge 
(S) or no challenge (∅)? 
Step 3: In case of DA with forced challenge, if 
there is responses by prover then the protocols are 
further classified into DAF, No Ack (No 




There are eight different prototypes for the 
classification and are summarized below as well as in 
Table 1: 
 
3.1. Implicit Authentication 
 
Implicit Authentication with no challenge (IAØ): If the 
message does not contain     any message of the form 
APriKey{•} or ApubKey{•}, but still requires entity A 
to compute a value  of the form ApriKey{ •}. And no 
challenge value is exchanged between the identities. 
Then it is called Implicit Authentication with no 
challenge. 
 
Implicit Authentication with forced challenge (IAØ): If 
the message does not contain any of the form 
APriKey{•} or APubKey{•}, and requires entity A to 
compute a value of the form APriKey{ •}. In addition 
to that, the verifier computes random nonce generated 
by the verifier(through public or private key) and then 
sends it as a plaintext or cipher text. Then it is called 
Implicit Authentication with forced challenge. 
 
3.2. Origin Authentication 
 
Origin Authentication with no challenge (OA∅): If the 
message contains the message of the form  
APriKey{•}, that is message is generated by applying 
private key and no challenge value is exchanged 
between the identities. Then it is called Origin 
Authentication with no challenge. 
 
Origin Authentication with self challenge (OAS): If the 
message contains the message of the form  
APriKey{•}, and the data is generated at the prover 
end, then it is called Origin Authentication with self 
challenge1. 
 
Origin Authentication with forced challenge (OAF): If 
the message contains the message of the form  
APriKey{•}, and the data is generated by the verifier 
then it is called Origin Authentication with forced 
challenge. 
 
3.3. Destination Authentication 
 
Destination Authentication with no challenge (DA): If 
the message contains message of the form 
APubKey{•},and no challenge values is exchanged 
between the identities then is it called Destination 
Authentication  with no challenge. 
 
Destination Authentication with forced challenge 
(DAF): If the message contains message of the form 
APubKey{•}, and the verifier produces the random 
nonce then the authentication is called Destination 
Authentication with forced challenge. It can be further 
divided into two types. 
 
1. With Acknowledgment(DAF, Ack): If the prover 
responds to the forced challenge by the verifier 
then the authentication is called Destination 
Authentication with forced challenge and 
acknowledgment. 
 
2. No Acknowledgment(DAF, No Ack): If the prover 
does not respond to the forced challenge by the 
verifier then the authentication is called Destination 




Table 1 – Protocol Classification 
 
 
3.4. Mutual Authentication 
 
There should not be more than 82 = 64 prototypes 
for mutual authentication by counting exhaustively. 
But the protocols in which, the responder entity B, act 
as an initiator can be regarded as illegal.  
 
This condition rules out many prototypes which are 
mirror images of each other. The authors have 
identified 17 prototypes which come under illegal 
prototypes, so in all there are 47 (64-17) prototypes, 
which can be used for classification. The prominent 
protocols are summarized below in the Table 2. 
Authentication Type Example 
IAØ A : ApriKey{ B } Implicit 
Authentication 
(IA) IAF 
A ← B : rB 
A:ApriKey { B, rB } 
OA ∅ A → B : APriKey{ B } 





A ← B : rB 
A→ B : APriKey { B, rB } 
DA∅ A ← B : APubKey{ B } 





A ← B : APubKey{ B, rB } 






1. A→ B: rA 
B: BPriKey{ rA } 
DA∅−∅ 1. A → B: BPubKey{ A } 
ΙΑ∅−ΙΑ∅ 
A: APriKey{ B } 
B: BPriKey{ A } 
IAF-IAF 
1. A → B: rA 
2. A ← B: rB 
A: APriKey{ B, rB } 
B: BPriKey{ A, rA } 
IAF-OAS 
1. A → B: rA , TSA , APriKey{ B, TSA } 
B: BPriKey{ rA } 
OAF-OAF 
1. A → B: rA 
2. A ← B: BPriKey{ A, rA }, rB 
3. A → B: APrikey{ B, rB } 
OAF- 
DAF,NoAck 
1. A → B: rA 
2. A ← B: APubKey{B, rB , BPriKey{ A, rA } } 
or, 
1. A → B: rA 
2. A ← B: BPriKey{ A, rA , APubKey{B, rB } } 
DAF,NoAck-
OAS 
1. A → B: BPubKey{A, rA , TSA , APriKey{ B, TSA } } 
or, 
1. A → B: TSA , APriKey{ B, TSA , BPubKey{A, rA } } 
DAF,Ack-
OAF 
1. A → B: BPubKey{ A, rA } 
2. A ← B: rA , rB 
3. A → B: APriKey{ B, rB } 
DAF,NoAck-
DAF,NoAck 
1. A → B: BPubKey{ A, rA } 
2. A ← B: APubKey{ B, rB } 
DAF,Ack-
DAF,Ack 
1. A → B: BPubKey{ A, rA } 
2. A ← B: APubKey{ B, rB }, rA 





4.1. Implicit Authentication with forced 
challenge- Implicit Authentication with forced 
challenge (IAF-IAF) 
 
Minimalist cryptography approach: The real light-
weight protocols were proposed by Pedro Peris-Lopez 
et al. namely, Lightweight Mutual Authentication 
Protocol (LMAP) [3] and Minimalist Mutual-
Authentication Protocol (M2AP)[4] and Efficient 
Mutual Authentication Protocol (EMAP) [5]. In all 
three of the protocols simple binary operations like 
XOR, OR, AND, mod 2m are used. Costly operation 
such as multiplication was not included.  All the 
protocols are based on index-pseudonyms (96-bits) 
which is a row of a table to store all information related 
to the tag. It also uses a 480 EEPROM and a 96-bit key 
divided into 4 parts updates after each message cycle. 
Mutual Authentication is as follows: 
 
Tag Identification: The reader sends a hello message to 
which tag responds by giving its IDS. 
 
Reader Authentication: The reader generates random 
numbers n1 and n2 which are used to generate sub-
messages A, B and C by using IDS and sub-keys K1, 
K2 and K3 respectively. The message A || B || C is 
transmitted to the tag where tag generates n1 and n2 
which it uses to generate D. By the sub-messages A 
and B, the tag will authenticate reader. 
 
Tag Authentication:  Tag sends the sub-message D in 
case of LMAP and D and E in case of M2AP and 
EMAP containing the Static Identifier which in turn 
authenticates the tag. The whole authentication process 







Tag Identification Reader   Tag: hello 
Tag  Reader: IDS 
Reader  Tag: A||B||C 
A = IDS(n)tag(i)  XOR  K1(n)tag(i) 
XOR n1 
B = (IDS(n)tag(i)  OR  K2(n)tag(i)) +  
n1 
C = IDS(n)tag(i) + K3(n)tag(i)  +  n2 
 
Tag  Reader: D 
D = (IDS(n)tag(i) + IDtag(i)) XOR 
n1 XOR n2 
 
M2MAP 
Tag Identification – Similar to LMAP 
A and C are same as LMAP 
B = (IDS(n) tag(i) ^ K2(n) tag(i)) OR  
n1 
Tag  Reader : D||E 
D = (IDS(n)tag(i) OR IDtag(i)) ^ 
n2 




Tag Identification – Similar to LMAP 
 
A is same as LMAP 
B = (IDS(n)tag(i) OR K2(n)tag(i)) 
XOR n1 
C = IDS(n)tag(i) XOR K3(n)tag(i) 
XOR n2 
 
Tag  Reader : D||E 
D = (IDS(n)tag(i)    ^K4(n)tag(i)) 
XOR n2 
E = (IDS(n)tag(i) ^ n1 OR 
n2)XORIDtag(i)M4I=1KI(n)tag(i) 
 
4.2. Vulnerability of EMAP, LMAP and 
M2AP:  
 
However, vulnerability of these protocols was 
identified by Tieyan Li et al. [5, 6, 7]. They showed the 
protocols were susceptible to attacks such as De-
synchronization Attack such that they can not 
authenticate each other in any following protocol run 
and Full-Disclosure attack which can cause disclosure 
of all the information present in the tag including tag’s 
ID. The countermeasures were proposed by build bit 
level error correcting mechanisms at the database and 
by sending a message Ď from tag irrespective of the 
1349
authentication of reader. Both the cases will provide 




In this paper we studied several different RFID 
authentication protocols and focused on the three main 
researches i.e. EMAP, LMAP and M2MAP.  We assert 
that other protocols can also be classified according to 
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